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ABSTRACT 
 
This research was aimed at examining the role of ethics in 
tendering.  To do this is was first necessary to define what is 
meant by ethics and in the context of tendering and how this 
relates to the various codes of tendering practice.  The next 
step was to conduct a questionnaire survey to ascertain the 
extent to which ethical behaviour in tendering is supported and 
practised in Australia.  This showed that most companies support 
the use codes of tendering, defend the right of withdrawal of 
tenders, disapprove of bid shopping, cover pricing and union 
involvement in the tendering process, support the principals' 
right to know what is included in a tender and the self-
regulation of the tendering codes.  In addition, most companies 
have developed, and follow, idiosyncratic ethical guidelines 
that are independent of, and often contrary to, the nationally 
prescribed codes.  The major conclusion is that a more empirical 
approach to the development of future ethical prescriptions in 
the field is needed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Ethical behaviour in business is defined as being "legal 
behaviour and a collection of moral principles or a set of 
values dealing with what is right or wrong, good or bad" 
(Beckman, 1963:115), with the set of values being "... shared 
not only with the business community, but also within society as 
a whole" (Saul, 1981:270).  The importance of ethics in business 
cannot be understated for, as Schochet (1979:22) observes "... 
the consequences of corporate activity have a greater impact on 
lives, business is becoming as much a social institution as an 
economic one". 
 
There is a commonly held belief in the business community, 
however, that ethics and business do not mix.  Many argue that 
the two are in direct conflict with each other, that "... the 
only truly ethical companies are going out of existence" (Saul, 
1981:271).  As a result, it has been said that business 
behaviour is "amoral" (De George, 1990:3).  This is in 
contradistinction to immoral, for immorality implies a 
deliberate act of evilness per se whereas businesses, according 
to De George, simply consider moral ideas inappropriate to 
everyday business dealings "... because they want to make a 
profit and therefore disregard some of their actions" (De 
George, 1990:4). 
 
Over the years, business amorality has been increasingly 
reinforced by a progressive relaxation of the rules which govern 
ethical behaviour, leading to laws being "broad and leniently 
enforced, which has allowed profit maximisation to reign as the 
ultimate standard by which to assess the property of conduct" 
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(Carr, 1968:43).  Public reactions to this in the Australian 
construction industry in relation to tendering practice have 
resulted in the creation of various common codes of tendering to 
legislatively regulate the industry.  Activities such as 
collusive tendering and the claim for unsuccessful tenderers' 
fees are regarded as unethical as well as fraudulent. 
 
There is some evidence in the USA that business attitudes are 
changing and that the number of sceptics of ethical codes may be 
diminishing.  The number of companies adopting some type of 
ethical codes is said to have increased from 42 percent in 1966 
to 73 percent in 1979 (Anon, 1979:1). 
 
In many aspects, the control of ethical behaviour is embodied in 
the philosophies underlying current systems.  Western economic 
systems, for example, with their emphasis on open competition, 
rely on such openness being protected.  This protection is 
manifested in the form of anti-trust laws.  Similarly, contract 
law, with the various stringent conditions on what is and is not 
enforceable, also offers some form of protection against 
unscrupulous behaviour.  The law of tort also exists to support 
ethical behaviour in making illegal acts or omissions which 
cause harm or damage to others.  This, of course, includes the 
insistence of a moral duty of care to others as well as 
penalising acts of negligence.  Like-wise, accountability, that 
is "... the obligation of giving (or being prepared, if called 
upon to give) an account of one's actions" (De George, 1990:93), 
is also a legally enforceable in certain situations under both 
law of contract and tort. 
 
The business of tendering for construction contracts has a large 
ethical component that is supported to some extent by law 
(although being necessarily pre-contract, is not supported by 
the law of contract).  There are, however, many ethical issues 
associated with tendering that are not supported by law - 
ranging from the costs incurred by unsuccessful tenderers, 
equitable tendering practices and rights of disclosure to the 
declaration of conflicts of interests.  In Australia, and many 
other countries, the appropriate ethical behaviour for these 
issues is prescribed in codes of tendering practice.  What is of 
interest is the extent to which these codes represent a valid 
ethical position and are adopted or exploited by tenderers and 
principals. 
 
This paper introduces the topic of ethics in tendering, its 
philosophical grounding, and codification in the Australian 
construction contract industry.  A questionnaire survey is 
described in which the views of principals and tenderers are 
solicited concerning the ethics of tendering in relation to 
tendering codes.  The results of this survey are then presented 
which show that, for the sample investigated, most companies use 
codes of tendering, defend the right of withdrawal of tenders, 
disapprove of bid shopping, cover pricing and union involvement 
in the tendering process, support the principals' right to know 
what is included in a tender and the self-regulation of the 
tendering codes. 
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ETHICS 
 
Ethics is the branch of philosophy that investigates morality 
and, in particular, the varieties of thinking by which human 
conduct is guided and may be appraised (Bullock and Stalybrass, 
1980).  The basic concern of ethics is of the meaning and 
justification of utterances about the rightness and wrongness of 
actions, in particular: 
 
 Intention.  The virtue or vice of the motives which prompt 
them 
 
 Means.  The praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the 
agents who perform them, and 
 
 Ends.  The goodness or badness of the consequences to which 
they give rise. 
 
Several fundamental, and as yet unresolved, philosophical 
problems arise out of these concerns: 
 
 Facts.  If moral utterances are really the statements of 
fact, true or false, that they grammatically appear to be, 
are they empirically statements about such observable 
characteristics as conduciveness to the general happiness, 
as ethical naturalists (cf Furst and Skrine, 1969) 
maintain, or are they a priori, as ethical rationalists (cf 
Hospers, 1967) maintain?.  If they are not statements of 
fact, as adherents to the doctrine of the naturalistic 
fallacy (cf Moore, 1903: ch 1), and, in particular, 
emotivists (cf Urmson, 1968), believe, how are they to 
interpreted - as exclamations or commands? 
 
 Concepts.  What is the relation of moral concepts to each 
other, is the rightness of actions inferable from the 
goodness of their consequences, and is the virtuousness of 
a motive to be inferred from the rightness of the actions 
that it typically prompts? 
 
 Axiology.  How can moral values be distinguished from 
values of other kinds (cf Wright, 1963), is the 
distinguishing mark the factual nature of the ends by 
reference to which moral injunctions are justified, such as 
the happiness of mankind in general, or is it in the formal 
character of the injunctions themselves? 
 
 Judgements.  What are the conditions under which moral 
judgements are properly applicable to conduct?  To be 
morally responsible, to be liable to the sanctions of blame 
and punishment, must an agent be free in the sense that his 
actions are uncaused, or is it enough that what he did was 
not wholly caused by factors that sanctions cannot 
influence? (cf Hospers, 1961; Frankena, 1963). 
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In the absence of any decisive solutions to these deep 
philosophical problems, it is to be expected that a high degree 
of ambivalence will prevail both within and between individuals 
and groups of people in their attitudes to ethical issues.  
However, until such time as solutions to these problems are 
found, and for communities to avoid the perils of anarchy and 
operate in an orderly manner, some pragmatic measures or 
principles have had to be adopted.  These principles are 
currently manifested in codes of behaviour which reflect, more 
or less, the nature of prevailing political, legal, economic and 
cultural mores of the communities affected. 
 
 
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES IN TENDERING 
 
Major ethical issues in tendering 
 
The literature reveals five major issues with ethical 
implications.  These comprise (1) withdrawal, (2) bid-cutting, 
(3) cover pricing, (4) compensation of tendering costs, and (5) 
collusion. 
 
 
Withdrawal 
 
Tenderers have the right by Australian law to withdraw a firm 
offer before the closing of tenders and a formal acceptance of 
that price is made.  This is to accommodate tenderers' late 
discovery of (1) a major miscalculation, (2) lack of interest or 
(3) lack of technical expertise.  The practice is, however, open 
to abuse by tenderers when faced with the prospect of another, 
more lucrative, contract.  In order to avoid possible over-
commitment, or just in greed, contractors in this may seek to 
withdraw the tender for the less lucrative contract.  If this 
practice was widespread, the principal could end up in the 
position of receiving no competitive tenders and thereby 
delaying the start of the contract until further tenders have 
been solicited.  This can cause major problems for the principal 
in having to reschedule the work, late completion (and therefore 
loss of income in the form of rents, profits etc from a new 
building.  If re-tendering is necessary, the additional costs of 
re-tendering will affect not only the principal but also the new 
tenderers. 
 
The very short times involved in construction tendering, where 
tenders are usually not forwarded until the eleventh hour, 
suggest that this procedure is not often used (not receiving any 
quote at all from subcontractors, especially in boom times, is a 
much greater risk). 
 
 
Bid-cutting 
 
The construction contract market contains many sellers and 
buyers, even for the same construction project.  The principal 
'sells' the main contract to the main contractor, the main 
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contractor 'sells' subcontracts to subcontractors, 
subcontractors 'sell' further contract of the supply of 
materials, etc, and so on down the line. 
 
In theory at least, bid cutting can take place at any point in 
the project delivery process and can be exercised by any of the 
contract 'sellers' involved.  The sellers may hunt for the best 
deals available from buyers by any means at their disposal.  
This can be either passive, by simply asking buyers for prices, 
or active, by negotiation from the basis of either an original 
buyer quote ('bid-peddling'), competitors' quotes ('bid-
shopping') or a seller budget figure which may be a purely 
arbitrary figure, based on factual or fictitious competitors' 
prices, or standard prices from published lists such as the 
Cordell or Rawlinson cost guides. 
 
In economic terms, there seems to be little wrong with this, the 
price of the contract depending on the level of demand for these 
subcontracts.  As long as the contract market is freely 
accessible and buyers are free to choose the contracts they wish 
to pursue, an efficient economic behaviour is maintained. 
 
As already mentioned, ethical questions concern the intention, 
means and ends of those involved in the practice, in this case 
the sellers.  Once tenders for the main contract have closed, 
the intention to bid cut can be justified by main contractors 
due to a lack of time in the tendering period, a lack of 
enthusiasm from subcontractors or difficulty in obtaining prices 
from subcontractors etc.  If the intention of the seller, 
however, is purely to enhance his own profits, the intention, 
though economically rational, can be seen as unethical.  From 
the principals viewpoint, for example, bid cutting by the main 
contractor might be regarded as improper if the lowered the 
costs of subcontracting are not passed on to the principal in 
some way (eg by an equivalent reduction in the main contractor's 
tender or through the terms of the contract itself).  Similarly, 
a subcontractor in this situation could feel himself to be 
exploited,  In both cases the accusation again is that of 
greediness of the main contractor as a result of an overly 
short-term view and at the expense of potentially valuable long-
term relationships.  In contrast, a main contractor might claim 
with some justification that the extra profits are needed to 
compensate for the disproportionately high levels of risks 
involved in main contracting compared with subcontracting and 
for which the competitive tendering system fails to adequately 
provide (risk values being regularly underestimated, especially 
by those contractors new to the field, leaving most construction 
projects insufficiently resourced). 
 
It may be fair to seek a reduction in a buyer quote if the 
seller honestly believes that the contract has been overpriced 
by the buyer, especially if the seller has a preference towards 
a regular 'customer' or the contract involves work of a 
specialist nature.  Commonly the cheapest price is not 
necessarily the best value for money, so preferred buyers should 
be given the opportunity to lower a quote for other reasons (eg 
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quality of workmanship, time on job, loyalty, etc).  Another 
regularly used method of obtaining cheaper prices from 
experienced and preferred buyers, is to arrange bulk deals which 
would ensure that their services were produced at a lower rate. 
 
What is often thought to be one of the most iniquitous aspects 
in the main-contractor-sub-contractor relationship is the main 
contractors' exploitation of the sub contractors' ignorance.  A 
particular example of this is in legal issues concerning the 
construction contract itself, where detailed knowledge is of a 
specialised nature and sometimes available only at a cost 
affordable by the main contractor and not the sub contractor.  
In such cases, the superior technical knowledge of the main 
contractor may be used at the unfortunate sub contractor's 
expense. 
 
With bid cutting, the opportunity exists for unscrupulous 
sellers to use this as a means of achieving a covert part of a 
longer term strategy to lower buyers' prices by pretending that 
the prices are needed for a current contract they are trying to 
buy.  The seller can then treat these prices as a precedent when 
compiling a future tender by reminding the buyers of these 
prices at a later date.  To counter this, buyers have several 
strategies available: insisting on the one-off nature of the 
reduced price; trying to ensure that sellers have a genuine 
intention to employ them on the current contract; refusing to 
provide quotes to known or suspected bid cutters.  At post 
tender stage, however, main contractors are in an even stronger 
position to pressurise subcontractors and suppliers into 
reducing their prices as there is a greater certainty of the 
main contractor, and therefore the subcontractors, actually 
doing the work and therefore less risk of underemployment.  As a 
result, main contractors are often able to reduce 
subcontractors' quotes by simple unilateral action. 
 
Another potential problem associated with the means involved in 
bid-cutting is that of disclosure.  A buyer may feel that his 
best prices are being regularly abused if the seller freely 
distributes his price around.  To counter this, buyers can adopt 
an eleventh hour strategy. 
 
An end product of bid cutting is that buyers can come to depend 
on sellers for their work, placing the sellers in what is 
essentially a monopolistic position.  The effect of this, as 
with any monopolistic situation, is to weaken the buyers' 
strategies by creating the potential for sellers to jeopardise 
the buyers' future workload.  A further problem is that if 
buyers have to reduce their prices too far, they may not be able 
to avoid making a loss and ultimately go out of business.  For a 
main contractor get 'burned' in this way seems to neither the 
main contractor or subcontractors' advantage.  Indeed, the 
interdependence of main and subcontractors can lead to the 
situation where the insolvency of one causes the insolvency of 
the other. 
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Cover pricing 
 
Cover prices are quotes tendered which have been provided at a 
rate specifically designed to lose a tender but which appear to 
be competitive.  The major reasons for the issuing of cover 
prices appear to be: 
 
1 Little buyer interest in the contract for sale 
2 Lack of buyer resources to competently complete the work 
3 Shortage of time for buyers to compile tender 
4 A desire to remain considered for future sales; and 
5 Little chance of winning due to the large number of 
competing buyers for the same contract 
 
In many countries the practice is not illegal.  In Australia, 
however, by directly attempting to lessen the standard of 
competitiveness in the tender, a building contractor guilty of 
providing a cover price is in breach of Section l S of the 
Australian Trade Practices Act. 
 
There are several reports of cover pricing, sometimes termed 
'non-serious' bids, in the UK, including Whittaker (1970) and 
McCaffer (1976).  An opinion survey (IQS Sussex Branch 
Committee, 1979) found that cover prices are taken despite 
attempts to prevent the practice but further concluding that the 
cover prices "did not distort the market prices".  Daniels 
(1978), in describing the work of the Builders' Conference, 
revealed that tenderers admitted to the use of cover-prices 
because of the cost of bidding, the high risk of losing, not 
wishing to offend and the short period allowed for tender 
preparation.  Moyles (1973) has suggested that, because of these 
constraints ".. contractors will usually give detailed attention 
to only desirable contracts", the remainder being "... prepared 
in a more approximate manner with a risk allowance to cover for 
unforseen circumstances and for the less accurate method of 
estimating".  Indeed, discussion at a conference organised by 
the Building Trades Journal (1979), openly revealed the practice 
of taking such covers, discussing alternative methods of 
acquiring such prices. 
 
The problem with cover pricing of course is that, whether or not 
a cover price is provided with good intentions, it still results 
in a lessening of real competition.  It also has te potential to 
lead to corruption and collusion between tenderers as the value 
of the cover price can only be obtained by the cover pricer 
contacting a genuine tenderer for an order of magnitude figure. 
 
Current folk-lore, however, suggests the practice is used to 
some extent, albeit unofficially.  Despite its illegality in 
Australia, there are some economic arguments in its favour.  One 
of these concerns the lapse of time that occurs between a 
tenderer agreeing to provide a tender and the deadline for the 
receipt of tenders.  During that time, unforseen circumstances 
can make the provision of a detailed, non-cover, price 
inappropriate.  A change in the buyer's market orientation, 
reduction in available construction and/or estimating resources, 
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new knowledge of the number and competitiveness of the competing 
tenderers.  Another possibility is that the buyer discovers 
during that time some defect in the seller, such as a policy for 
not inviting non-tenderers to tender for future contracts, or 
unethical behaviour! 
 
 
Compensation of tendering costs 
 
The costs of tendering are a recognised expense which many would 
argue represent a large proportion of general overhead costs.  
The question then is where the burden of these costs should lie. 
 Should principals be required to help construction contractors 
by reimbursing them directly with part or the whole cost of 
tendering, or should the tenderers carry the whole of the costs 
themselves? 
 
If principals have to reimburse tenderers, it is possible that 
tenderers could find some way of making a profit by obtaining an 
over-reimbursement by, say, surreptitiously producing quick, 
cheap and deliberately uncompetitive tenders, termed non-bona 
fide tenders.  Whether or not a tender is bona fide can be 
difficult to know especially in selective tendering.  This would 
of course be open to abuse as non-bona fide tenderers might act 
collusively and charge for remaining non-competitive.  This 
would eventually ruin the competitiveness of the tender, and as 
such be in breach of the Trade Practices Act, ultimately 
resulting if undetected, in financially hurting the principal.  
Collusion is examined in more detail below. 
 
There may be an argument for compensating costs in negotiated 
tenders or design and construction for a client, however.  To be 
fair to all players, payment for estimating services in lump sum 
and especially open tendering might not be practical unless the 
contractor was required to submit its own bill of quantities.  
The compensation of unsuccessful tenderers has been well 
documented in the press over the last few years especially with 
the recent Royal Commission into Productivity in the Building 
Industry of New South Wales (Gyles, 1993).  One of the 
fundamental discussions of this report must be to determine 
whether or not it is commonly acceptable to the industry to load 
tender prices with fees which will be used to directly 
compensate unsuccessful tenderers.   
 
Another possibility is for sellers to provide compensation to 
tenderers in the event of an abandoned or postponed contract 
sale.  Standard codes of tendering state that tendering should 
not be invited unless there is a firm commitment by the seller 
to proceed with contract sale.  Often this may require further 
negotiation to adjust the scope of works quality of workmanship 
etc. 
 
 
Collusion 
 
Collusive tendering occurs where several buyers have been 
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invited to tender and the buyers agree between themselves either 
not to tender, or to tender in such a manner as not to be 
competitive with the other buyers.  This method of price control 
is in direct breach of Section 45 of Australia's Trade Practices 
Act as it seen to be a potential means of fixing, controlling or 
maintaining prices which may have the effect of substantially 
lessening competition.  Construction tendering codes of ethical 
conduct support this view and prohibit "collusion on tenders, 
inflation of prices to compensate unsuccessful tenderers, hidden 
commissions or any other such secret arrangements" (Standards 
Australia, 1993:6). 
 
The main reasons for the practice are that it provides (1) an 
even distribution of work for all involved, (2) a means of 
entering what is an apparently bona fide bid, and (3) a means 
for discursion and agreement over illicit profit making such as 
amounts for cover prices, secret fees or unsuccessful tenderers 
fees.  The practice, or possibilities for the practice, of 
collusion therefore is a factor in several other issues related 
to ethical tendering.  The problem with collusion is that it is 
contrary to the ideals of competition.  It only benefits those 
parties to the agreement at the expense of those outside, 
including principles and other contractors. 
 
Sheldon (1982) has examined collusion in the UK in some detail. 
 In view of the uncertainty of competitive bidding and the 
degree of interdependence between firms engendered by such 
uncertainty, Sheldon holds that tendering may be conducted a 
priori  through collusive agreements as such agreements are "... 
an attractive means of maintaining a steady flow of work and 
achieving higher joint, risk-adjusted, discounted profits".  
Little evidence of collusive agreements seem to be available 
however, which is perhaps to be expected.  Sheldon's view of the 
process plant industry is that the variety of process areas in 
contracting and also periodic excess capacity would be a 
destabilising factor in any such agreements.  Barriers to entry 
of the industry are also discussed but is concluded that "... 
the ability of firms to actually raise bid prices in excess of 
an average cost is a function of the buyer's sensitivity to 
price and non-price factors in a bid, rather than a function of 
the barriers to entry, and hence the ability of firms to 
actually limit prices is curtailed by the buyer's power". 
 
For the contraction industry, effective collusive bidding seems 
even less likely than the process plant industry as barriers to 
entry are far less severe and the proliferation of projects is 
extensive, especially small projects.  Collusion, if practiced 
at all in the construction industry, must surely be restricted 
to a very limited number of specialised projects. 
 
The definition of collusion can also be applied to the process 
as well as the outcomes.  The very fact that tenderers 
communicate with each other can be taken to be a form of 
collusive behaviour.  This raises the question of whether any 
discussion should be allowed, and, if so, the range of topics 
allowable.  It might be thought, for instance, that an exchange 
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of standard unit prices ('price-books') is collusive   but that 
a general discussion of tendering arrangements, conditions of 
tendering and prices submitted for previous contracts, and the 
likely ethical behaviour of specific sellers, is not.  This 
raises a possible contradiction between what is necessary for 
effective competition, in the access to relevant information, 
and what may be used by tenderers to restrict competition by 
restrictive agreements.  That such agreements may be overt, 
covert, express, implied or even inadvertent, makes the issue 
that much more difficult to decide. 
 
Formal communications between main contractors are provided by 
builders' associations and their involvement in the cooperation 
and assistance of collusive tendering agreements have been 
exposed in the recent Royal Commission.  The Royal Commission 
uncovered involvement by the NSW MBA, the Newcastle MBA and the 
AFCC in the organisation of secret meetings of tenderers and 
subsequent special fee charges.  These meetings had various 
purposes including the discussion of tendering conditions, but 
have been exposed as a place for the discussion and agreement of 
payments to be made in Unsuccessful Tenderers' Fees and Special 
Fees to be secretly loaded into the cost of each participating 
tender.  As the Royal Commission has discovered, the 
organisation and planning of secret commissions and fees were 
extensive and have caused a deserved loss of respect towards the 
building industry in New South Wales.  Builders' associations 
and unions are, however, required to be involved with successful 
tenderers to negotiate site conditions, allowances etc (except 
in the housing industry).   
 
 
Codes of tendering 
 
The ethical principles in tendering are formally prescribed in 
the codes of conduct related to the tendering process.  In 
Australia, these are intended to benefit industry "through the 
delivery of higher productivity, high quality of work, better 
working conditions and the elimination of malpractice" 
(Standards Australia, 1993:4). 
 
The codes are designed to delegate responsibilities to both 
competing tenderers and the principal (client, owner) to achieve 
a theoretical balance between what is right and what is common-
sense for each individual project.  They are applicable both 
generally - to many of the traditional forms of contracting (eg 
lump sum or design and build) - and specifically - to projects 
of a less standard nature (eg restoration work) or where the 
risks involved are difficult to determine or delegate.  These 
are typified by the Interim Australian Standard Code of 
Tendering, AS 4120 (Int), which prescribes twelve basic 
principles: 
" 1 Tendering at all levels in the industry shall be 
conducted honestly and in a manner that is fair to all 
parties involved. 
 2 Parties shall comply with all legislative obligations 
including those required by trade practices and 
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consumer legislation. 
 3 Principals shall have regard to the costs of bidding 
and the number of tenderers. 
 4 Tenderers shall only bid where they intend to carry 
out the work if successful. 
 5 Principals shall only call for tenders after they have 
made a firm commitment to proceed with the project. 
 6 The conditions of tendering shall be the same for each 
tenderer. 
 7 Parties shall not engage in practices such as 
collusion on tenders, inflation of prices to 
compensate unsuccessful tenderers, hidden commissions, 
or any such other secret arrangements. 
 8 Principals, contractors and suppliers shall be 
prepared to attest to their probity, if necessary by 
Statutory Declaration or other reasonable means. 
 9 Tender documents shall specify the principal's 
requirements as clearly and precisely as possible and, 
when documents are altered, sufficient time shall be 
allowed for all tenderers to review and revise their 
tenders. 
 10 The confidentiality of all information provided in the 
tendering process shall be fully preserved, however, 
it is acceptable to have public openings of tenders 
and disclosure of tender prices. 
 11 Any party with a conflict of interest shall declare 
those interests. 
 12 Tenderers shall retain their right to intellectual 
property with tenders, including title thereto." 
(Standards Australia, 1993:4). 
 
Clearly, if the injunctions contained in the codes are to 
satisfy the ethical purpose for which they were designed, they 
must engender behaviours that are ethically appropriate.  The 
problem, of course, is that this may not be fully realised in 
practice.  The ethical principles themselves contained in the 
codes may not be 'correct'.  Even if correct, the wording of the 
codes may not be in one to one correspondence with the 
principles espoused.  Also, the players affected may not respond 
fully to the letter or spirit of the codes.  Indeed, some 
players may seek to find ways, perhaps covertly, of deriving 
commercial advantage from the shear fact that the codes exist, 
at the expense of others who are more ethically inclined. 
 
The extent to which these issues are amenable to empirical 
investigation is not known in the field of tendering ethics as 
it is simply assumed that the issue of prescriptive, and 
occasionally normative, rules is all that is needed.  In view of 
the above considerations, not only does such an assumption 
appear to be untenable but some empirical possibilities are 
immediately apparent.  As ethical considerations are essentially 
concerned with human perceptions, whether of factual or value 
issues, the use of a research instrument designed to record such 
perceptions would seem to be the most appropriate approach.  The 
simplest and most obvious such instrument is the questionnaire. 
 The use of a questionnaire will enable some measures to be 
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obtained on the key problem areas relevant to tendering ethics, 
ie the extent to which tendering codes (1) reflect the ethical 
notions of tenderers and the community at large, (2) conflict 
with professional codes, (3) are overtly or covertly considered, 
rejected, accepted and adopted by tenderers and (4) the 
resulting implications on their business operations in the form 
of commercial secrecy or surreptitious behaviour. 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In the absence of any known previous research in this field, 
attention was concentrated on the extent to which the 
'principles' embodied in the Interim Australian Standard Code of 
Tendering, AS 4120 (Int) were accepted and applied in 
construction tendering, in order to test Saul (1981) and De 
George's (1990) assertion that businesses were not able to 
accommodate such ethics in their business mores and practices.  
A questionnaire was designed to elicit views on each relevant 
ethical item in the code.  This comprised four sections.  The 
first section offered respondents the opportunity to choose 
whether or not their answers should be kept confidential.  The 
respondents' professional industry involvement and their major 
forms of contract work were also requested to allow any cross-
group differences to be detected.  The second section requested 
information on the use of codes of ethics in everyday business 
practice, the satisfaction with these codes and methods of 
possible improvement.  The third section was concerned with the 
topic of ethics in bidding procedures and general business 
attitudes in tendering including the timing for the withdrawal 
of tenders, the practices of beating down prices and the 
submission of cover prices.  The fourth section related to the 
theory and practices of unethical business behaviours in 
tendering, in particular the payment for estimating services, 
collusion between competing tenderers, compensation for 
unsuccessful tenderers, and the intervention of building unions 
or associations in such dealings.  Finally, respondents were 
offered the opportunity to freely speak on any areas of 
particular interest, including any comments for or against 
matters raised in the discussion.   
 
Naturally, obtaining honest factual information for a topic as 
controversial as ethical and unethical practices in construction 
tendering is not an easy task and it was expected that many 
organisations would not respond.  The questionnaire was 
therefore designed to provide anonymity and obtain the greatest 
number of responses possible.   
 
The questionnaire was then distributed to one hundred potential 
respondents comprising building contractors, subcontractors, 
architects and quantity surveyors in Brisbane, Cairns, Sydney, 
Melbourne, Hobart, Canberra, Adelaide, Perth and the Northern 
Territory.  Each respondent was provided with approximately two 
weeks to answer the questionnaire. 
  
The responses to the questionnaire were then summarised in total 
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and in disaggregated form by the type of respondent, ie 
architects, quantity surveyors, building contractors and 
subcontractors, for analysis and interpretation by the 
researchers. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
A total of forty (40%) completed questionnaires were returned. 
The highest number of responses came from building contractors 
(13) while the greatest percentage of respondents to those 
invited were quantity surveyors (67%).  The least number of 
responses were from subcontractors (7).   
 
Statistical responses were grouped into their number and 
percentage categories for "Yes", "No" or "Not Applicable/ 
Irrelevant" answers.  In cases where individual answers were 
left blank, each response was compared to the total number of 
responses to each particular question.  The total response is 
summarised in Table 1. 
 
 
Section 1: General matters 
 
Confidentiality 
 
The first question was designed to determine the respondents' 
confidentiality requirements and to reassure respondents of 
their right to speak freely without recourse if they so chose.  
61% of respondents chose to keep their responses confidential.   
 
Professional identification and major types of contract 
 
Questions 2 and 3 sought to identify respondents' place within 
the industry and their major types of work involvement.  The 
greatest number of respondents were building contractors 
involved in lump sum tendering.  Lump sum was also the most 
common form of contract tendering system involving the 
respondents.  Other major forms of contract procurement used 
were design and construction, construction management, and 
negotiated tenders.   
 
 
Section 2: Codes of tendering 
 
The majority of respondents (77%) claimed to follow a standard 
code of ethics in their everyday work oriented towards their 
professional training (question 4).  There was no one most 
common form of standard produced code of ethics used in general 
practice by the respondents.  The variety of those in use 
included QMBA, HIA, Australian Standard Code of Tendering, State 
Government Codes of Tendering, and the JCT (Joint Contracts 
Tribunal) Code of Conduct for Selective Tendering.  The majority 
of those respondents (79%) who do follow a set of tendering 
procedures, whether standard or in-house, were satisfied with 
the requirements of those codes. 
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Some of the respondents have their own company policies to 
protect themselves from exploitation when submitting prices.  
One practical example of this was a plumbing subcontractor 
provided quotes only to main contractors known not to indulge in 
bid shopping. 
 
 
Section 3: Ethics of bidding 
 
Permissible withdrawal of tenders 
 
A large majority (88%) of respondents defended the right for 
tenderers to withdraw offers before the closing of tenders 
(question 8). 
 
 
Bid Cutting 
 
Question 9 dealt with the fairness of asking subcontractors to 
lower their quotes in pre-tender estimating.  Many respondents 
(59%) believed it to be a fair and practical business method for 
winning tenders.  The majority of main contractors (67%), 
however, supported the practice, provided the subcontractor 
concerned is compliant. 
 
Whether this should apply after a tender has closed and a 
contract has been awarded is investigated in question 10 which 
is concerned with respondents' attitudes towards main 
contractors unilaterally reducing subcontractors' quotes after 
the award of a contract.  Most respondents (72%), believe the 
practice to be unethical, with a fairly large proportion of 
building contractors holding the opposite view.   
 
Question 11 sought to discover whether or not the respondents 
believed in asking a preferred subcontractor to lower their 
quote to a rate below a less preferred competitor.  Commonly, 
11% of all respondents felt that preferential subcontractors 
should be given the right to lower their quote to beat a less 
favoured competitor.  42% of building contractors agreed with 
the practice believing that the construction industry is a 
competitive market where subcontractors are free to adjust their 
quotes if they so chose.  Some of the respondents felt that if 
there was no genuine intention to use a subcontractor pricing a 
job, then they should not be invited to submit a tender. 
 
18% of total respondents admitted to the practice of providing 
an open quote in the hope of bettering the price (question 12). 
 A greater percentage (33%) of building contractors agreed with 
this method of price reduction than the overall range of 
responses.  The majority of respondents disagreed with this 
practice. 
 
 
Cover Prices 
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Question 13 asked whether having been invited to tender, the 
respondent believed in the theory of submitting cover prices for 
work they either did not want or could not afford the time to 
tender on.  64% of respondents did not believe in the theory of 
covering.  A similar rate of 65% of building contractors also 
disagreed with the practice.   
When asked in question 14 had the respondents themselves ever 
submitted a cover, 34% admitted that they had.  Of the building 
contractors questioned 46% confessed to submitting cover prices 
in tenders. 
 
Question 15 sought to discover whether or not the respondents 
knew of other contractors using cover prices.  Many (64%) of the 
respondents said that they knew of other companies who used 
cover prices.  67% of building contractors also knew of others 
who used cover prices.  One subcontractor (who did not choose to 
keep all the answers confidential) stated that providing covers 
was "standard practice in the electrical industry". 
 
 
Section 4: Unethical practices 
 
Collusive Tendering 
 
Question 16 considered the issue of compensating the cost or 
estimating over and above those accounted for in the cost of 
general overheads.  Although there was no clear trend, a 
substantial response of 55% believed that building contractors 
should be paid for tendering.  Of the building contractors 
questioned.  54% agreed that they should be reimbursed.  Several 
respondents stated that builders should not be paid for the 
service or otherwise many builders would establish themselves as 
professional losing tenderers. 
 
An inconclusive 46% of respondents believed that competing 
tenderers should be allowed to discuss between themselves 
certain matters of importance to the submissions (question 17). 
 Of the building contractors questioned, a split response of 50% 
stated that they should be free to discuss these matters.  Some 
of the respondents stated that prices or rates should never be 
discussed in such meetings.  Another subcontractor stated that 
tenderers should be able to discuss tendering arrangements or 
participation if they feel difficulty or distrust with the 
developer. 
 
Question 18 discussed the principals' right to reject offers and 
asked whether they have the right to know what has been included 
in a tender.  Of the respondents questioned, a high 82% felt 
that they have a right to know what issues have been included.  
Similarly 88% of building contractors also agreed with the 
principal's right to know what has been included in a tender.  
One quantity surveyor respondent believed that the principal 
should already understand the scope of works but profit, 
overheads, and prices etc, were not the principal's business.  
Another however suggested the co-operative practice of 
"partnering" (used extensively in Europe) would be beneficial in 
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Australia but would require the full disclosure of costs. 
  
Question 19 asked whether tenderers, bona fide or not should be 
compensated for the costs of producing a losing tender.  A total 
of 79% of all respondents disagreed with the payment of 
estimating services.  Similarly, 77% of building contractors 
also chose to disagree with the theory of compensation for 
unsuccessful tenderers. 
 
Question 20 sought to gain industry opinions of the issue of 
collusive tendering over the compensation of unsuccessful 
tenderers fees.  A high 79% of respondents did not agree that 
competing tenderers should be allowed to meet and discuss 
amounts to be awarded to each party.  Of the building 
contractors questioned, 95% disagreed with collusion between 
tenderers over this issue. 
  
 
Association Involvement 
 
A very high 93% of respondents to question 21 objected to any 
potential association involvement in the tendering process.  
Similarly the total response from building contractors agreed 
that builders' associations should be prohibited from any 
dealings in the tendering phase. 
 
Finally, question 22 dealt with personal knowledge of collusive 
dealings that have occurred, perhaps involving the cooperation 
of builders' representative associations.  Of those questioned, 
only 27% of respondents claimed that they were aware of direct 
examples of collusive dealings in the industry.  Few (8%) of 
participating building contractors actually knew or were 
prepared to admit to knowing of any such arrangements.  Several 
of those respondents who claimed to have some knowledge of the 
practice cited press reports from the Royal Commission as their 
sole source of information.  One stated that to the particular 
respondent's knowledge, many more examples of collusive dealings 
go unreported.   
 
 
Section 5: General comments 
 
Respondents were given the opportunity in question 23, to add 
any further comments of interest on the topic and that they were 
free to agree or disagree with any points raised in the 
discussion.   
Several commented that, although business ethics are desirable, 
tendering ultimately involves making hard commercial decisions, 
especially in recessionary times. 
 
One respondent believed that pre-tender subcontract negotiation 
was the art of obtaining keen prices for the benefit of the 
owner. 
 
The plumbing contractor previously mentioned (to whom 
confidentiality was not chosen) said "the building industry in 
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this state (W A.) is stuffed".  This respondent claimed that 
there are too many subcontractors with little business sense who 
flood the market, lower the accepted industry rates by not 
paying the industry awards and insurances, do the work at 
unrealistically low amounts, successfully cause the rest of the 
industry to appear overpriced and eventually go out of business. 
 This encourages the larger builders to shop an honest 
subcontractor's price used in a tender, after the award of a 
contract and "try to knock 10% to 15% off your quote".   
 
The unethical behaviours of many principals were a major concern 
to one contractor who has been regularly disappointed with: 
projects that did not proceed; incomplete tender information: 
disclaimer clauses in contracts; suspect tender evaluation: 
acceptance of lowest tenderers who may be of poor quality or 
eventually more expensive; bid shopping to other contractors; 
difficulty in approving variations, and; complicated company 
structures of owners in receivership situations.  Business 
ethics will always be determined by individuals and there are 
the good and bad in every sector.  The difficulty lies in their 
differentiation. 
 
Another respondent stated that in the case of major works 
involving design and construction, and possible lump sum 
tendering, the award of compensation could be warranted if the 
sum was nominated by the principal and agreed to by all 
tenderers.  However several respondents claimed that the 
compensation of estimating costs would lead to a lessening of 
competition as some would become "professional tenderers" that 
is they would intentionally price their work too high to live 
off the compensation.  Eventually if selections are kept keen 
and regularly updated, this practice could not continue for 
long.   
 
An architect respondent commented that, in his experience, where 
collusion is evident, one contractor will "come to the fore" as 
not wishing to participate in the collusion with others.  
Nevertheless it displays the vital importance of the selection 
process in obtaining reputable, honest tenderers. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
There are few surprises in these results.  The support for the 
right for tenderers to withdraw offers before the closing of 
tenders was expected.  Similarly, the support for bid-cutting 
was mainly from those would were expected gain the greatest 
benefits from the practice - main contractors and, to some 
extent, principals. 
 
That most respondents did not believe cover-pricing to be 
ethical is surprising, especially as one third the respondents', 
and almost half the main contractor respondents, admitted to the 
practice.  This ambivalence between theory and practice seems to 
be that the theory is overly inflexible.  Clearly, as some 
respondents claimed, there are some circumstances, eg where 
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there is a likelihood of being left out of future tender lists, 
where the practice can be justified. 
 
In view of the difficulties in identifying non-bona fide 
tenderers, it is not surprising to find that most respondents, 
including main contractors, disagreed with the payment of 
estimating services to all tenderers.  There is a significant 
minority that approve of this procedure however to suggest that 
it is worthy of further investigation. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper introduces the topic of tendering ethics in relation 
to the philosophical foundations of ethics and current codes of 
practice in the area.  A questionnaire survey is described aimed 
at determining industry opinions and practices of ethical 
tendering procedures and in which information was gained through 
the distribution of an Australia-wide questionnaire to persons 
involved with the tendering process.  Forty completed 
questionnaires were returned out total of one hundred 
questionnaires distributed. 
 
The findings of this survey are that: 
 
o Most (61%) respondents felt the issues to be sufficiently 
sensitive to require anonymity of their responses. 
 
o Lump sum tendering is the most common method of contract 
procurement to the participating respondents, although 
design and construction, construction management and 
negotiated tenders are also used.   
 
o Many (77%) companies claim to use codes of ethical 
tendering procedures but with no clear favourite emerging. 
 Company or in-house codes of ethics are very common due to 
the desire for self-regulation and need for ethical rules 
in business decision making policies.   
 
o The right for permissible withdrawal of prices is defended 
by most respondents (88%). 
 
o There is a majority (59%) support for the practice of 
asking subcontractors and suppliers to reduce their prices 
to be used in a tender providing that the reduction of 
subcontract prices should not be used to increase the 
contractor's margin. 
 
o There is general disagreement (72%) with the practice of 
asking for a reduced subcontract price to meet a building 
contractor's budget, given that adequate time has been made 
available for keen pricing of work. 
 
o The practice of inviting preferred subcontractors to beat 
the price of less favoured ones' is partially accepted 
(41%). 
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o A minority (33%) of building contractors value the practice 
of bid peddling.   
 
o A majority (64%) disagreed with the practice of cover 
pricing.  Nevertheless it was found that the provision of 
covers is a commonly accepted method of tendering. 
 
o A majority (55%) believed that tenderers should be 
reimbursed the cost of tendering.  An even greater majority 
(79%) however considered it unacceptable for competing 
tenderers to receive compensation for the costs of 
producing a losing tender.  Many believed that competing 
tenderers should not be allowed to discuss and/or charge 
unsuccessful tenderers' fees without the prior consent of 
the principal. 
 
o There is no clear agreement, either for or against, for 
general discussions between competing contractors over 
prices, tendering conditions etc. 
 
o There is strong support (82%) for principals having the 
right to know what has been included in a tender provided 
that this knowledge is limited to the scope of works only. 
  
o There is a near unanimous (93%) view that building 
associations or unions should take no part in the tendering 
process. 
 
o That codes of ethics should be determined by self-
regulation always staying within the statutes. 
 
These results do not support Saul (1981) and De George's (1990) 
assertion that businesses are not able to accommodate ethics in 
their business mores and practices.  Clearly, if the veracity of 
the answers to the questions posed in the survey is accepted, 
ethics are very much accommodated, insofar as tendering practice 
is concerned.  It is also clear, however, that the ethical 
principles contained in the tendering codes, are not completely 
accepted or adhered to by all the players involved.  This leads 
to two important practical questions concerning the ethical 
validity of the codes themselves - are the codes right or wrong 
and, if they are wrong, how can they be put right? 
 
The answer to the first of these questions depends on the, as 
yet unresolved, status of ethical principles in general.  
Considering the likely alternatives: 
 
The ethical naturalist view.  If the principles contained in the 
codes are really empirical statements of fact about observable 
characteristics, then there should be some extant evidence of 
this empirical basis.  There is no such evidence and therefore 
no grounds for supporting the ethical validity of the codes. 
 
The ethical rationalist view.  If the principles contained in 
the codes are a priori statements that are true but not yet 
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substantiated by any evidence, the case is much stronger but 
inconclusive, as the evidence, if and when it comes along, may 
either support or reject the a priori position.  In this case, 
the codes must stand until either an alternative a priori set of 
principles is proposed or the empirical evidence is forthcoming. 
 
The emotivist view.  If the principles contained in the codes 
are not to be regarded as factual but simply a matter of 
personal judgement, then the issue turns on the validity of the 
judgements made in constructing the principles.  On the evidence 
provided in this survey, this position is being held by many of 
the respondents as each bring their own judgements into play in 
the form of their own ethical policies.  Of course, this 
provides no insights into the validity of each player's view but 
does suggest that the underlying mechanism of the ethical 
behaviour to be emotivist. 
 
It appears, therefore, that the validity of the principles 
contained in the codes, and therefore their ethical validity, is 
uncertain.  As a result, the failure or otherwise of the players 
to observe the codes, provides little guidance on either the 
ethical validity of the codes or the actions of the players.  
This conclusion, although of little pragmatic value, 
nevertheless does suggest why the problem of code setting and 
enforcement has been so difficult to resolve.  It is 
encouraging, however, that there seems to be a general 
willingness by the players for a solution to be found. 
 
Two possibilities are immediately apparent.  The first is to 
accept the emotivist position and continue with the present 
system in which the players each follow their own ethical 
inclinations either in conjunction with, or in opposition to, 
the formal prescriptions.  As the survey has shown, this is not 
only exactly the current situation but also considered to be 
inadequate by the players involved.  The second is to adopt a 
more rational approach through empirical analysis of the effects 
of alternative ethical principles in terms of perceived 
happiness or equitable outcomes of the stakeholders.  One 
approach to this is to develop an a priori set of principles for 
empirical testing.  Such a priori principles could be developed 
either from a theoretical framework, the current codes, or an 
amalgam of existing emotivist codes, perhaps through a 
compromise between players.  This would seem to offer a real 
prospect for progress in the field. 
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